Approach to Integrate Fuzzy Fault Tree with Bayesian Network  by Wang, Yanfu & Xie, Min
 Procedia Engineering  45 ( 2012 )  131 – 138 
1877-7058 © 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi: 10.1016/j.proeng.2012.08.133 
Abst
Fuzz
amon
disad
Suge
conv
 
© 20
Tech
 
Keyw
1. In
I
refle
gene
to ca
prob
num
work
exist
fuzz
F
shor
lesso
cond
poss
caus
integ
orga
with
 
* Cor
2
App
aChina Univ
ract 
y fault tree (FF
g events. How
vantage of FFT
no model that 
erting FFT into
12 The Auth
nology. 
ords: Fuzzy fault
troduction  
n traditional 
ct real situati
rally difficult
pture the imp
ability values
bers and app
ed on this are
ing FFT meth
y gate to repla
ault tree (FT
tcoming of F
n for the alg
itional proba
ible when ob
e the undesir
rated with B
nized as follo
 how to transf
 
responding autho
012 Intern
roach to
ersity of Petroleu
bCity 
T) can offer an
ever, FFT ca
 and BN, an a
can handle unc
 BN are presen
ors. Published
 tree (FFT); Bay
fault tree ana
on of system
 to estimate t
recision of fa
 [1]. The earli
lied the fuzzy
a by analyzin
ods cannot d
ce traditional
) is entirely d
T, Bobbio et 
orithm of tra
bility, which 
servation is p
ed fault, whi
N in this pap
ws: In section
orm FFT to B
r. Tel.: +861369
ational S
 integrat
W
m, No. 66 Chang
University of Ho
 efficient meth
nnot incorpor
pproach of inte
ertainties in th
ted. The integr
 by Elsevier L
esian Network (B
lysis (FTA), 
 because of a
he precise pro
ilure data. In
est work in f
 extension p
g fuzzy reliab
eal with unce
 gate.  
eterministic a
al. proposed 
nsforming FF
reflect the con
erformed on t
ch is the adv
er, for which
 2, the metho
N.  Section 4
7851195; E-mail
ymposium
e fuzzy 
ANG Ya
jiang West Road
ng Kong, 83 Tat 
od of represen
ate the eviden
grating FFT w
e relationships
ation algorithm
td. Selection
N); fuzzy analyt
the probabili
mbiguity and
babilities of 
 this regard, 
uzzy fault tre
rinciple to d
ility using st
rtainties in rel
nd no eviden
the conversio
T into BN i
tribution to t
he system [7].
antage of FT
 the probabi
d of FFT bas
 carries out th
 address: wangy
 on Safet
fault tre
nfu a,*, XI
, Economic& Te
Chee Avenue, Ko
ting the fault c
ce into the re
ith BN is propo
 among differe
 is then demon
 and/or peer-r
ical hierarchy pro
ties of basic 
 imprecision
basic events. 
it may be mo
e (FFT) treat
etermine the 
andard approx
ationships am
ce can be giv
n algorithm 
n this paper.
he probability
 But BN is un
 [8]. To apply
lity calculatio
ed on the Tak
e possibility 
anfu@upc.edu.cn
y Science
e with B
E Minb 
chnological Dev
wloon Tong, Ho
auses and han
asoning as B
sed in this pap
nt events is in
strated on an o
eview under 
cess (FAHP); Fu
events are tre
 of some bas
Thus, it is of
re appropriate
ed possibiliti
occurrence p
imations for 
ong events. I
en without re
of transformi
For BN, the 
 of the event
able to determ
 the above a
n is more fl
agi and Suge
assessment of
 
 and Tech
ayesian
elopment Zone ,Q
ng Kong, China 
dling fuzzy inf
ayesian Netwo
er. Firstly, the 
troduced. Seco
ffshore fire cas
responsibility
zzy numbers 
ated as exac
ic events. In 
ten necessary
 to use fuzzy
es of basic ev
robability of 
the membersh
mprovements
-evaluating th
ng FT into B
root nodes a
ual fault [6]. U
ine accurate
dvantages of 
exible and si
no model is in
 offshore fire
nology 
 networ
ingdao 266555, 
ormation in the
rk (BN). To 
FFT technique 
ndly, the trans
e study. 
 of the Beijing
t values, whi
many circum
 to develop a 
 numbers inst
ents as trape
top event [2].
ip functions 
 have to be m
e FT [4]. To o
N [5], which 
re ranked in 
pdating the p
ly how the fa
the two meth
mpler. The d
troduced. Se
. 
k 
China 
 relationships 
overcome the 
of Takagi and 
lation rules of 
 Institute of 
ch could not 
stances, it is 
new method 
ead of exact 
zoidal fuzzy 
 Singer also 
[3]. However,
ade to apply 
vercome the
is a salutary 
terms of the 
robability is 
ilures jointly 
ods, FFT is 
escription is 
ction 3 deals 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
132   WANG Yanfu and XIE Min /  Procedia Engineering  45 ( 2012 )  131 – 138 
2. Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis 
The conventional gates of FT cannot function very well when there are uncertainties in the relationships among events. 
To handle this fuzzy information, a new gate based on the Takagi and Sugeno (T–S) model is presented. The failure 
possibility of the top event can be computed by the T–S model from the fuzzy possibilities of the basic events. 
2.1. Takagi and Sugeno model 
Takagi and Sugeno (T–S) model includes a set of IF-THEN fuzzy rules, which can be used to describe the relationships 
among events, leading to the construction of the T–S Gate. Consider the rule l of the T–S model [9]: Suppose the possibility 
magnitude of basic events  and upper event Y are denoted respectively by ( ), 
( ), … , ( )  and  , which satisfy the following equations:  
 
Then the T–S gate can be represented by the following fuzzy rules, 
“AND”  “OR” gates in FTA can be implemented by T–S gate. “AND” gate can be represented by the following fuzzy rule: 
 
Whilst the “OR” gate can be represented by the following fuzzy rules: 
 
First of all, to obtain fuzzy rules, the possibility magnitude of basic events should be defined according to historical 
data and experts’ experience. After that, the fuzzy failure possibilities of top event can be estimated using fuzzy logic. 
Suppose the possibility of basic event is , possibility of top event can be obtained by the T–S gate [10], 
     and   is the membership of   for the corresponding fuzzy set. 
Suppose the fuzzy possibility of the basic events is , , …,
,  then the possibility of the rule  l  is :  . 
The fuzzy possibility of the top event is then calculated by:  
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To obtain the fuzzy possibility of upper event at each state, the fuzzy possibility of upper event under each fuzzy rule is 
estimated using fuzzy AHP. 
2.2. Calculate the possibility of upper events under each rule using fuzzy AHP 
2.2.1. Rating state 
Suppose an upper event Y, which has k states ( ), is decided by n basic events . To elicit 
probabilities that Y is at some state (i.e. ), we should determine each . In another words, we should estimate a 
probability weight  under each rule, where  is the probability of . Traditionally, is 
specified directly by experts, using their knowledge and experiences. When the number of states is small, such a method 
may be feasible. With the increase of states of basic event, estimating probabilities directly to all states at one time may 
inevitably induce biases and inaccuracies. 
An alternative way is giving fuzzy number to perform pair-wise comparisons between states for generating their 
probabilities. Since there are only two instead of n states considered at one time in a pair-wise comparison, it should be 
much easier to provide fuzzy linguistic variable than the direct estimation of probabilities. The fuzzy AHP method is able to 
solve uncertain ‘fuzzy’ problems. In the new approach, the probability of an upper event under some fuzzy rule can be 
determined by the following pair-wise comparison matrix [11]: 
 
  
(3)
where A is the pair-wise comparison matrix. is the comparison value of the likelihood of   over that of .  is a 
triangular fuzzy number specified by asking the domain experts questions like “comparing states  and , which one is 
more likely to occur and how much more?” Domain experts will answer the question using the following fuzzy linguistic 
scale. The linguistic evaluation scale, given in Table 1, can be used for triangular fuzzy numbers. 
Table 1. Fuzzy scale in AHP 
Linguistic scales Triangular fuzzy scale Triangular fuzzy reciprocal scale 
Just Equal (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
Equally probable (1/2,1,3/2) (2/3,1,2) 
Weakly probable (1,3/2,2) (1/2,2/3,1) 
Strongly more probable (3/2,2,5/2) (2/5,1/2,2/3) 
Very strongly more probable (2,5/2,3) (1/3,2/5,1/2) 
Absolutely  more probable (5/2,3,7/2) (2/7,1/3,2/5) 
2.2.2. Calculating the probability of upper event under some rule  
After the aggregation, the fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix of upper event under some rule is defined. Then, the fuzzy 
weight matrix is calculated by Chang’s Extent Analysis Method [12] as follows: 
The value of fuzzy synthetic extent with respect to ith object is defined as: 
                            (4)
To obtain    , perform the fuzzy addition operation of k extent analysis values for a particular matrix such that 
 (5)
To obtain , perform the fuzzy addition operation of  (i=1,2,…k) values such that 
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 (6)
and then compute the inverse of the vector : 
 (7)
The degree of possibility of  is defined as: 
                                 (8) 
and can be equivalently expressed as follows: 
                      V(C2 C1)=hgt C1 C2 =μC2 d =
   1,                         if m2 m1 
     0,                         if l1 u2       
l1-u2
m2-u2 - m1-l1
,      otherwise          
  (9) 
where d is the ordinate of the highest intersection point D between and ,To compare and ,  
we need both the values of   and . The degree of possibility for a convex fuzzy number to be 
greater than k convex fuzzy number (i=1, 2, …, k) can be defined by: 
V C C1,C , …, Ck =V C C1 and C C2  and…and C Ck = min V C C1i ,  i=1,2,…,k                               (10) 
Assume that   n=1, 2,…, k; . Then the weight vector is given by 
 where  are k elements.  
Via normalization, the normalized weight vectors are  (where  is a non-fuzzy number), 
which is the probability of upper event Y under some rule. After the probability of upper event Y under each rule is defined, 
we can substitute in the equation (2) to calculate the probability of upper event Y. 
3. Converting  Fuzzy Fault Tree to Bayesian Network  
Generally, FT can be converted into BN, and inference technique of BN can be used to obtain classical parameters of FT 
[5]. Dynamic FT can also be mapped into an equivalent discrete-time Bayesian network [13]. Similarly, FFT can also be 
transformed into BN. To demonstrate how to integrate FFT with BN, the following assumptions are given: 
(1) The failure possibilities of basic events are triple (high/medium/low correspond to 1/ 0.5/ 0 respectively). 
 (2) Relationships between basic events and top event are represented by fuzzy logical T–S gate. 
FFT can be transformed into an equivalent BN as follows: (1) Each basic event in the FFT is converted into a 
corresponding child node in the BN. The child nodes are triple (high/medium/low) and let the failure magnitude of the 
corresponding state be 1, 0.5 and 0 respectively; (2)Each child node in BN is assigned the same prior probability as the 
possibility magnitude of basic event in FFT;(3)For each gate of the FFT, one relevant parent node is created in the BN; 
(4)Child nodes in the BN are connected to parent node as basic events are connected to the associated gates in the 
FFT;(5)Each parent node of BN is assigned to the same conditional probability as the relevant fuzzy T-S gate in FFT; the 
parent nodes in the BN are connected as the relevant gates are connected in the FFT. One example of converting OR, AND 
gate of FFT into equivalent nodes of BN is shown in Fig. 1. 
4. Case Study  
In this section, the integration algorithm mentioned above is demonstrated on an offshore fire case. Based on historical 
experiences, the fire and explosion hazard of separator, flash drum, drier and compressor are generally larger than other 
units’ on offshore platform [14]. Taking flash drum unit as an example, the most credible fire scenario is vapor cloud 
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explosion with fire: Gas release from flash drum and the released gas might produce flammable vapor clouds. If vapor cloud 
meets ignition source with delay, it will cause vapor cloud explosion. Firstly, the most credible fire scenario of flash drum 
unit is analyzed by FFT. Secondly, the FFT is converted to BN and the BN model is analyzed. Finally, the occurrence 
possibility of offshore fire scenario and the posterior probabilities of all basic events are predicted by BN inference. 
 
 
Fuzzy Fault Tree: OR Gate Bayesian Network: OR Node 
Fuzzy Fault Tree: AND Gate Bayesian Network: AND Node 
Fig.1. AND and OR gate of Fuzzy Fault Tree and Bayesian Network 
4.1. Fuzzy fault tree analysis 
 
Fig.2. Fault tree of vapor cloud explosion with fire for flash drum 
FFT is constructed to analyze causal effect of vapor cloud explosion in Fig.2. The possibilities of basic events are defined 
according to historical data, collected from Offshore Reliability Data Handbook [15]. Suppose the fuzzy possibilities of all 
basic events failing with a magnitude of 0.5 are the same as 1’s.  The possibilities of all basic events are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Basic events of the fault tree for the most credible scenario of flash drum 
 Basic event possibilities of X=1 possibilities of X=0.5 possibilities of X=0
X1 Release from other units 0.2 0.2 0.6 
X2 Ignition due to electric spark or external heat 0.35 0.35 0.3 
X3 Release from joint of gas pipeline 0.065 0.065 0.87 
X4 Release from gas pipeline 0.0045 0.0045 0.991 
X5 Release from upstream pipeline 0.003 0.003 0.994 
X6 Release from joints of upstream pipeline 0.045 0.045 0.91 
X7 Release from downstream pipeline 0.00003 0.00003 0.99994 
X8 Release from joints of downstream pipeline 0.045 0.045 0.91 
X9 High-pressure in vessel causing rupture of vessel 0.003 0.003 0.994 
X10 Release from joints or flange 0.0075 0.0075 0.985 
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Taking M1 as an example, how the IF-THEN fuzzy rules can constitute a T-S gate is demonstrated as follows: Firstly, the 
experts express their judgments for the possibility of M1 under each fuzzy rule.  This can be carried out via linguistic terms 
according to Table1. Secondly, the possibility of M1 under the fuzzy rule 1 is calculated using Chang’s Extent Analysis 
Method. The calculation results of the possibility of M1 under each fuzzy rule are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Probability table of T-S GATE M1 
X1 X2 1 0.5 0 
0 0 0 0.375 0.625 
0 0.5 0 0.411 0.589 
0 1 0 0.485 0.515 
0.5 0 0 0.436 0.564 
0.5 0.5 0.212 0.324 0.464 
0.5 1 0.467 0.221 0.312 
1 0 0 0.398 0.602 
1 0.5 0.413 0.218 0.369 
1 1 0.751 0.249 0 
The fuzzy possibility of M1 can be obtained according to T–S model as follows:   
;    
  
   
The fuzzy possibilities of T–S gates are calculated using the same way. Their calculation results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Fuzzy possibility of each T–S gate 
T–S gate High(1) Medium(0.5) Low(0) 
M1 0.12901 0.37654 0.49445 
M2 0.06064 0.094216 0.845148 
M3 0.0389 0.046854 0.914247 
M4 0.004683 0.176941 0.818376 
M5 0.003127 0.142215 0.854658 
T0 0.0852 0.08473 0.83 
   
The failure possibilities of vapor cloud explosion with fire for flash drum unit can be calculated as follow:  
; 
 ; 
  
4.2. Converting fuzzy fault tree to Bayesian Network 
  According to the translation rules of converting FFT to BN, BN corresponding to above FFT is depicted in Fig.3. The 
possibilities of child node are the same as the possibilities of basic events, which are shown in Table 2.  The CPTs of parent 
node are the same as the possibilities of fuzzy gate. Such as, the CPT of node “fire_in_other_units” is the same as the 
possibility of M1 gate, which is shown in Table 3. 
After all the CPTs are elicited, the probability analysis can be performed using Bayesian inference. From the Fig.3, it can 
be seen that the fuzzy possibility of top event is similar with the calculation results of FFT: 
;  
The posterior probabilities of basic events given accident happened are estimated by BN, which is shown in Fig.4. 
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Fig.3. Bayesian network of vapor cloud explosion with fire for flash drum 
 
Fig.4. Posterior probabilities of basic events given the offshore fire happened 
5.    Conclusions 
The fuzzy logic in FFT allows fuzzy information to be incorporated. Fuzzy gate can deal with uncertainties of the failure 
causes, due to insufficient knowledge of the relationships among basic events. Therefore FFT is more suitable for analyzing 
failure causes than traditional FT. BN is useful for assessing probabilistic relationships among basic events.  
The case study shows that FFT can be directly converted into BN and BN can be used for predicting the marginal 
posterior probabilities of basic event, which is often used to identify the criticality of basic events. Controlling the 
occurrence possibility of these crucial events would considerably reduce the possibility of accidents. The model of 
combining FFT and BN is more flexible and useful than traditional FT model. 
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